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Introduction 
The development of a regional smart specialisation strategy has been interpreted as 
requiring the participation of a diverse range of actors in an entrepreneurial discovery 
process. According to the European Commission Guide to Research and Innovation 
Strategies for Smart Specialisation (RIS 3) these should include conventional 
innovation actors such as private sector enterprises and investors, public authorities 
and their agencies, and public research and educational/training organisations, but 
also wider representatives of regional civil society with a stake in local development 
processes (Foray et al., 2012). This position draws on the concept of the quadruple 
helix - which adds civil society, the community or the public to the triple helix of 
government, industry, and universities - and the more open and user-centred 
innovation processes that this is suggested to underpin (see Arnkil et al., 2010). It also 
makes a related link between smart specialisation and broader forms of innovation 
that are oriented towards social goals or challenges (for a critical discussion of this 
see Richardson et al., 2014). A subsequent paper by Carayannis and Rakhmatullin 
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(2014) has reaffirmed this association between the quadruple helix model and smart 
specialisation by viewing it in its context of the EU Europe 2020 ‘smart, sustainable 
and inclusive growth’ agenda. Others have suggested that quadruple helix models of 
innovation that include the wider community could be particularly important for 
peripheral or less favoured regions with a thinner institutional ecology of firms and 
research organisations (Kolehmainen et al., 2015) and this can provide an alternative 
to the pursuit of high-technology based growth as part of their smart specialisation 
strategies (Nordberg, 2015). 
  
The quadruple helix is, however, (like smart specialisation itself) still at a stage of 
becoming more widely established as an academic concept. Therefore, despite the 
appealing nature of the confluence between these contemporary ideas (smart 
specialisation, quadruple helix, social innovation), there is a need for more reflection 
on the ways in which they are actually articulated with one another in innovation policy 
and practice. This chapter will approach this task by considering quadruple helix 
relationships as a particular institutional arrangement that may form in a region around 
a specific innovation domain. The importance of institutional and governance contexts 
(including previous innovation strategies) in shaping smart specialisation approaches 
in different regions has been noted in previous work (e.g. Morgan, 2013; McCann and 
Ortega-Argilés, 2014). However, this chapter is equally interested in how smart 
specialisation, as a process of identifying and developing regional innovation priorities, 
can itself be a dynamic through which institutional arrangements change. This can 
therefore contribute to the wider, but still relatively neglected, question in economic 
geography of how institutions co-evolve with the emergence of new paths in national 
or regional economies (see Strambach, 2010). By viewing this in relation to smart 
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specialisation it also adds to the growing number of studies that highlight the role of 
regional policy in this process of path creation (e.g. Dawley, 2014; Coenen et al., 
2015).  
 
These themes will be explored through two case studies of the institutional 
development of smart specialisation domains in the regions of Northern Ireland in the 
UK and Tampere in Finland, which are drawn from the FP7 project Smart 
Specialisation for Regional Innovation (Vallance and Kempton, 2015; Vallance and 
Goddard, 2015). The specific strategic priorities focused on in both regions – 
respectively connected health/stratified medicine and smart city – although referring 
to very different innovation domains, do have in common technological development 
and application with a strong social as well as economic dimension. Related to this, in 
both cases there is also a prospective role for societal users, whether patients or city 
residents, in the innovation process. This suggests the relevance of the quadruple 
helix framework, but the analysis will show that the actual applicability of this concept 
to these empirical cases needs to be qualified in reference to the ongoing emergence 
of an innovation system in which these societal actors can be integrated. The priority 
areas of connected health/stratified medicine and smart city are not unique to the 
regions of Northern Ireland or Tampere, but fields that are developing on at least a 
European scale. Indeed in both cases the region is part of a growing cross-border 
partnership or transnational network around the area in question. However, the 
particular form they are taking as innovation domains in these regions is strongly 
shaped by specific institutional factors that will be outlined as part of the analysis 
below. These factors include multi-level governance systems, inherited policy and 
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economic development paths, and the mix of different organisational actors in the 
innovation ecology and their patterns of systemic interaction.  
 
The chapter has four further sections. A literature review positions the quadruple helix 
concept in an innovation system framework. The middle two sections are the regional 
case studies. These are based on key actor interviews (16 in Northern Ireland and 12 
in Tampere) carried out during 2014 and 2015, supplemented with analysis of policy 
documents and other secondary sources. The concluding section discusses the 
parallels between the two cases and the implications for our understanding of 
institutional processes underpinning smart specialisation. 
 
Conceptual framework: quadruple helix arrangements as emerging innovation 
systems 
The quadruple helix is an extension of the triple helix concept introduced by Henry 
Etzkowitz and Loet Leydesdorff. This concept broadly represents an innovation 
system framework formed of university, industry, and government relations 
(Leydesdorff and Etzkowitz, 1996). Like other approaches in this evolutionary systems 
tradition, therefore, it is based on the understanding of innovation as a non-linear 
dynamic arising from the interaction of different organisations (Etzkowitz and 
Leydesdorff, 2000). By designating that this interaction takes place between actors 
from three institutional spheres this framework allows for a more complex set of 
connections than models based on dyadic relations (e.g. bi-lateral university-industry 
links), and hence scope for variety that can prevent the system in question from 
becoming locked into a single technology trajectory (Leydesdorff, 2000; Viale and 
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Pozzali, 2010). An important element of the triple helix concept that follows from this 
is a concern with institutional transformation via co-evolutionary processes of network 
formation and adaptation between (as well as within) each of the three helices 
(Etzkowitz et al., 2000). A key example of this is the emergence of an entrepreneurial 
model of the university through the growth of the academic sphere’s interface with 
business and the development of linkages through intermediary organisations such as 
industry-focused research centres or technology transfer offices (Etzkowitz et al., 
2000; Etzkowitz, 2003). This process, seen as first occurring in select U.S. universities 
(e.g. Stanford, MIT) during the twentieth century, is central to a normative account of 
transition to the knowledge-based economy that has informed the adoption of the triple 
helix concept as a paradigm for national or regional development as well as an 
analytical framework for understanding innovation processes (Etzkowitz, 2008).  
 
The quadruple helix concept has also been positioned in relation to normative 
discourses around the changing nature and role of knowledge production in 
contemporary economies and societies. For instance, Arnkil et al. argue that: 
 
Quadruple Helix (QH), with its emphasis on broad cooperation in innovation, 
represents a shift towards systemic, open and user-centric innovation policy. 
An era of linear, top-down, expert driven development, production and services 
is giving way to different forms and levels of coproduction with consumers, 
customers and citizens. This also sets a challenge for public authorities and the 
production of public services.  
(Arnkil et al., 2010; executive summary)  
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This leads them to place the role of the user in innovation at the heart of their definition 
of the quadruple helix – i.e. as the fourth helix in cooperation with firms, universities, 
and public authorities. However, while this emphasis on users may not have been an 
explicit focus in the arguably more science and technology focused triple helix 
framework, it is recognised in the concept of interactive learning processes in the 
original national innovation systems concept, referring particularly to user-producer 
(firm) relationships (Lundvall, 1992). Subsequently, a focus on users - whether firms, 
communities, or individual customers – has become a central concern in innovation 
studies (e.g. Franke and Shah, 2003; Von Hippel, 2005; Grabher et al., 2008). 
Therefore, defining the quadruple helix in terms of being ‘user-oriented’ alone is not a 
strong enough basis on which to differentiate it as a new model: instead it is necessary 
to specify the role of civil society organisations, community groups or individual 
citizens as users, and address the distinctive challenges to more traditional 
understandings of innovation processes that this entails. The inclusion of these actors 
also reinforces the prospect that innovation in the quadruple helix can be towards 
broadly social goals; compared to the economic goals that are still the focus if, for 
instance, the users in question were taken to be members of the public as consumers 
helping firms to create new products. 
 
Work by Carayannis and Campbell (2009; 2012), which represents the highest profile 
attempt to formulate a quadruple helix model in the academic literature, does specify 
that the fourth helix refers to what they call ‘media-based and culture-based public’ 
and ‘civil society’. These categories particularly reflect their aim of promoting a 
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connection between principles of democracy and knowledge or innovation processes 
(Carayannis and Campbell, 2012). Here the quadruple helix concept is positioned as 
part of a wider proposed framework describing a ‘21st century fractal innovation 
ecosystem’, which includes an assortment of linked concepts put forward by the 
authors: for instance, mode 3 knowledge production (which combines the dynamics of 
mode 1 and mode 2 knowledge outlined by Gibbons et al. (1994)); academic firm (a 
private sector analogue of the entrepreneurial university); and even the Quintuple 
Helix (extending the model further to include the natural environment) (Carayannis and 
Campbell, 2009; 2012; Nordberg, 2015). This proliferation of new theoretical 
constructs, many of them an iteration on existing ideas, however seems speculative 
and not strongly grounded in either conceptual reasoning or empirical evidence. As 
Leydesdorff (2012) argues, the analytical validity of the quadruple helix concept should 
not in itself be assumed, but needs to be verified through research studies of different 
types (e.g. see Marcovich and Shinn, 2011). Indeed in an earlier discussion, 
anticipating the quadruple helix development, Leydesdorff and Etzkowitz (2003) argue 
that civil society should not be separated out as a fourth institutional actor, but its 
presence should be seen as a precondition for innovation to occur through the triple 
helix configuration.   
 
The position taken in this chapter is that the quadruple helix concept, like the triple 
helix before it, should be approached as a potentially useful variant on wider innovation 
system theories. By viewing it in this context, certain well established principles, 
common to different territorial (national and regional) or non-territorial (technological 
or sectoral) innovation system concepts, can be drawn on to help substantiate the 
quadruple helix framework. As summarised by Edquist (1997), these characteristics 
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include a holistic view of innovation (i.e. not just narrowly R&D) and its underlying 
context-specific conditions (including institutional factors), a historical (and 
evolutionary) perspective on the development of innovations, and an emphasis on the 
interdependency of organisations in a non-linear innovation process. Crucially here, 
the innovation system approach also underpins the conceptualisation of ‘system 
failures’ as a theoretical rationale for innovation policies (see Lundvall and Borrás, 
1997; Metcalfe, 2005; Laranja et al., 2008). This is of analytical value because it 
focuses on the network, institutional and capability failures that can prevent a 
functioning innovation system from emerging (Smith, 2000). Metcalfe et al. argue that 
innovation systems should not be seen as pre-given entities, but as only forming when 
various elements of what they call the innovation ecology of a territory become 
“connected and focused upon the solution of particular innovation problems” (Metcalfe 
et al. 2012, p.22). This view of innovation systems, therefore, directs us that the 
interrelationships between the different institutional spheres of the triple helix, and 
even more so with the non-traditional innovation actors introduced by the quadruple 
helix, should not be assumed to exist in advance. Instead they emerge and evolve 
over time around the development of particular problems or domains.  
 
For Metcalfe (2005; Metcalfe et al. 2012) this emergence of an innovation system 
occurs through a process of self-organisation driven largely by market competition. In 
the case studies that follow, however, the more deliberate role of innovation policy in 
the regions (encompassing their smart specialisation strategies) will be emphasised. 
For both of these examples the sections below will describe the co-evolution of the 
innovation domain in question and related institutional arrangements in the region. The 
quadruple helix concept in itself does not prescribe the spatial scale at which it should 
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be applied1, but the focus of these case studies is on the given regions (including their 
extra-regional governance settings and network linkages). This allows the features of 
embedded capabilities, technological relatedness, and external connections that are 
identified by McCann and Ortega-Argilés (2015) as central to smart specialisation in 
this territorial context to be reflected. Barriers that remain to the full emergence of 
innovation systems around these domains, and particularly to the formation of 
quadruple helix relations, will also be highlighted in the case studies.  
  
Northern Ireland: Connected Health and Stratified Medicine 
Innovation policy in Northern Ireland began developing during the early 2000s, 
following the establishment in 1998 of the current Northern Ireland Assembly as a 
devolved administration within the UK. This was driven by an understanding that the 
prevailing industrial policy focus on providing grants and subsidies to individual firms 
in the region would need to be supplanted by measures that could increase collective 
innovation capabilities and systematic network connections (Best, 2000; Cooke et al., 
2002). From the first innovation strategy, however, there was a recognition that, 
because of its small size, Northern Ireland would have to prioritise capacity building in 
certain areas of science and technology (DETINI, 2004). This informed the 
establishment in 2007 of a Science Industry Council for the region called Matrix, which 
has produced a series of reports aimed at identifying future market opportunities for 
Northern Ireland in key areas through an analysis of existing technical capabilities and 
horizon-scanning foresight activities covering periods of 2, 5 and 10 years. The broad 
                                                          
1 Indeed, in the extended framework proposed by Carayannis and Campbell (2009), the multi-
level (global and local) nature of innovation processes is emphasised. 
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areas covered by these reports are life and health sciences, information and 
communication technologies, agri-food, advanced materials, advanced engineering, 
and sustainable energy. As an organisation providing advice to government Matrix has 
become influential in Northern Ireland, and despite most of its Horizon reports not 
having been updated since they were first written in 2008, the market opportunities 
they identify form the core priorities in the smart specialisation framework for the region 
and the recent innovation strategy from which this is derived (DETINI, 2014a; 2014b). 
These foresight exercises have therefore been the de facto form that the 
entrepreneurial discovery process has taken in the region. In this respect, the Matrix 
vehicle has the attribute of bringing together a sub-panel for each report that has a 
wide participation from across different sectors (including smaller companies).  
  
The first Life and Health Sciences Horizon report gave a clear focus on two areas as 
market opportunities for Northern Ireland: home-based care and personalised 
medicine (Matrix, 2008). The former of these, Home-based Care, has come to be 
referred to by the slightly wider term of connected health, which is defined as: 
 
a model for healthcare delivery that uses technology to provide healthcare 
remotely. … Connected Health encompasses programs in telehealth, remote 
care (such as home care) and disease and lifestyle management, often 
leverages existing technologies such as connected devices using existing 
cellular networks and is associated with efforts to improve chronic care.  
 (Matrix, 2015, p.18). 
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The latter of these opportunities, personalised medicine, at “its most basic … refers to 
the use of information about a person’s genetic makeup to tailor strategies for the 
detection, treatment, or prevention of disease” (Matrix, 2008, p.6). It is linked to the 
fields of stratified and precision medicine, and their development in Northern Ireland 
can be seen here as broadly overlapping. Life and Health Sciences was the first of the 
Matrix areas for which an updated Horizon report was produced in 2015. This takes a 
more holistic view of the life and health sciences sector in Northern Ireland, but still 
features connected health and precision medicine (with clinical trials, health data 
analytics, and diagnostics) as key strengths of the region that can enable the 
development of treatments or interventions in a number of areas (e.g. oncology, 
cardiology, diabetes, etc.) (Matrix, 2015). 
 
The selection of these two areas as strategic priorities was based on a number of 
existing health and life science capabilities distributed across the academic, private, 
and public sectors in the region. Northern Irish expertise in connected health can be 
traced back to the invention of the portable defibrillator by Frank Pantridge, a clinical 
academic at Queen’s University Belfast (QUB), during the 1960s. This laid a 
foundation for further academic research into this and other areas related to mobile 
healthcare, which is now mainly concentrated in the other university in the region, the 
University of Ulster (UU), and specifically its Nanotechnology and Integrated 
BioEngineering Centre (NIBEC) founded in 1990 (then as the Northern Ireland 
BioEngineering Centre) by a former colleague of Pantridge (John Anderson). NIBEC 
has also been the source of several spin-out firms, including two important medical 
device companies (Intelesens and HeartSine). In reference to stratified medicine, as 
the more research-intensive university of the two in the region overall and home of its 
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medical school, QUB has significant life and health science capabilities of relevance, 
particularly in cancer and cell biology. As part of the UK higher education system, the 
presence of a medical school ensures that the university has very close institutional 
relationships with local National Health Service (NHS) hospital trusts around both 
clinical training and research (Goddard and Vallance, 2013). The University of Ulster, 
however, also has a biomedical research capability, and has recently (2013) 
established the Northern Ireland Centre for Stratified Medicine in Derry~Londonderry 
(the second largest city in the region). This centre is attached to the Clinical 
Translational Research and Innovation Centre (C-TRIC), a partnership between Derry 
City Council, UU, and the local health and social care (HSC) trust. Because UU does 
not have a medical school itself, this partnership has allowed the Centre for Stratified 
Medicine to have the access to patients that is essential for their research. Away from 
academic research, Northern Ireland does have some existing life and health science 
industry to match this smart specialisation priority. This is, however, mainly comprised 
of three relatively large, indigenous companies that have been active for at least thirty 
years; Norbrook Laboratories (veterinary pharmaceuticals), Almac (services to the 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries), and Randox Laboratories (clinical 
diagnostics). Smaller innovative life and health science related companies are, by 
contrast, not currently as well represented in the region.  
 
As mentioned earlier, the Matrix exercises have been influential in guiding the 
innovation strategy priorities of the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment 
(DETI) in the Northern Ireland Executive, and the economic development agency 
(Invest NI) that is its main delivery vehicle. The clear signalling of these two areas in 
the first life and health sciences report has, therefore, fed into them becoming a target 
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of government promotion and investment in the region. For example, Invest NI has 
provided core funding for the establishment of the Connected Health Innovation 
Centre (CHIC). This is one of three Competence Centres that have been operating in 
Northern Ireland since 2013 (with two more in the process of being set-up) that support 
business-led research projects involving collaboration between at least three 
companies at a ‘pre-competitive’ stage before commercialisation2. CHIC is hosted by 
NIBEC in UU, and runs on a subscription model with (at the time of the research) 
around thirty member companies. As well as managing the centre and its operations, 
NIBEC supports the companies by guiding them in developing project ideas (through 
for instance issuing calls for interest in certain areas), and then provides researchers 
(employed with the Invest NI funding) to carry out the research. In this way, the CHIC 
model (similar to the other Competence Centres) can be understood as an attempt to 
leverage the academic expertise and organisational capacity in the University to 
increase the wider innovation capabilities of the region, and particularly the relatively 
small companies that comprise most of its membership. The model developed does 
include a mechanism for the companies to commercialise intellectual property 
generated by the projects, but more often the benefits for them relate to exploratory 
opportunities for learning, testing ideas, and (given the collaborative nature of the 
projects) networking with other companies. CHIC can also potentially be a vehicle for 
bringing companies closer to the HSC service in Northern Ireland, building on the 
existing relationships that NIBEC has with this sector. 
 
                                                          
2 The other four operating or planned Competence Centres are also in areas that align with 
the Matrix technology areas (sustainable energy, advanced engineering, agri-food, and cloud 
computing). 
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Government support for connected health in Northern Ireland has equally come from 
the department responsible for health and social services (DHSSPS). As part of a 
landmark review of Northern Ireland’s HSC sector in 2011 (Transforming Your Care) 
the potential value of more extensive use of connected health technologies was 
advocated, particularly in reference to the goal of allowing more patients to be treated 
in their own homes (Compton et al., 2011). In the same year DHSSPS and DETI/Invest 
NI signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to “develop Health, Social Care, 
and Economic opportunities in Connected Health for Northern Ireland, through better 
coordination of public assets and funding” (Invest NI/DHSSPS, 2011, p.2). Although 
not including binding commitments, this formalised agreement is still a useful 
expression of intended future collaboration in Northern Ireland where political and 
administrative divisions often make joined-up policy between government 
departments challenging. This MoU was followed-up with the formation of a project 
group to advise government on steps to maximise the potential economic and 
employment benefits from the adoption of connected health in the HSC sector3. The 
momentum generated by the MoU also enabled plans to establish a Northern Ireland 
Connected Health Ecosystem as a permanent organisation to be realised in 2012. 
This Ecosystem runs regular meetings in the region that provide networking 
opportunities for its various members from the HSC sector, universities and colleges, 
and private companies of different types with an interest in this area. In parallel with 
this, a larger European Connected Health Alliance began to develop that now links 
members of this Northern Irish community with a growing number of other ecosystems 
                                                          
3 A direct recommendation of this group, currently in the process of being implemented, is the 
creation of a physical facility (the HILS Hub) that will aim to help coordinate joint projects 
between HSC, academic, and private sector health and life science actors in the region. 
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representing various locations (and markets) in the rest of the UK, the Republic of 
Ireland, continental Europe, and now also North America and (through an affiliated 
organisation) China.  
 
In relation to the strategic priority in stratified/precision medicine, Invest NI has also 
made some significant investments in developing the scientific capability of the region. 
These include funding for the UU Centre for Stratified Medicine mentioned above, but 
also for research activities in Queen’s University Belfast – most notably a joint R&D 
and staff secondment initiative with local company Almac around cancer drug 
discovery. An opportunity for further institutional development in this area arose with 
the announcement in 2014 of a new UK Catapult Centre in Precision Medicine. 
Catapult Centres are technology and innovation centres in a number (currently ten) of 
strategic areas that have been established by the UK government’s innovation agency 
to carry out business-focused research and development. None of the previous 
Catapult Centres has, however, had a presence in Northern Ireland. During the period 
covered by this research, Northern Ireland was in the process of bidding to host all or 
part of this Precision Medicine Catapult. This bid had support from the government 
and Invest NI, and drew together the different actors with research or commercial 
assets related to this field in the region. The result of this competition is that the 
Catapult Centre will be across multiple locations in the UK, with the main base in 
Cambridge and six regional hubs including Belfast. Being part of a wider network, 
therefore, means that the level of associated resource received by Northern Ireland 
will be relatively limited, and direct involvement in the centre seems likely to be 
restricted to Queen’s University and parts of the health service based in Belfast. 
However, interviewees identified benefits for Northern Ireland of the Catapult related 
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to the status it conveys as a UK centre of excellence in this field, and the future 
opportunities it presents to build new relationships with the rest of the UK.      
 
The new institutional arrangements outlined above have undoubtedly contributed to 
the formation of more systematic relationships across university, HSC, and private 
sector actors around these strategic innovation domains in Northern Ireland. There 
are, however, also barriers within this system that will have to be overcome if these 
relationships are to be extended or deepened in the future. The least developed part 
of this institutional configuration currently is the private sector, particularly beyond the 
three larger companies mentioned above. In the case of stratified/precision medicine 
this is perhaps unsurprising given the still mainly exploratory nature of this scientific 
field. The commercial applications of connected health are arguably also still 
emerging, but the political commitment to this in DHSSPS in Northern Ireland (which 
has already implemented large programmes in health telemonitoring) means that there 
is potentially a significant market within the region. However, the interviews indicated 
that local companies have thus far found it difficult to sell their connected health 
products to the health service. This some suggested could be related to the 
procurement rules the NHS operates under, but others cited the lack of clinical 
engagement by companies – particularly early on in the product development process 
and by those entering this new field from a technology rather than health background. 
The adoption of connected health technologies in the HSC sector itself, however, also 
represents a change to instituted ways of working in large public sector organisations 
that will take time and require the clinical benefits of, for instance, telemonitoring to be 
more comprehensively demonstrated. This is despite the sector in Northern Ireland 
having distinctive institutional features that should facilitate this process, including 
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already integrated health and social care NHS trusts, and being the first part of the UK 
to introduce an effective electronic care record system for easy access to patient data 
by clinicians. Beyond the public sector, the widespread use of connected health 
technologies for home-based care will also need the participation of the health workers 
delivering this care in Northern Ireland, many of whom are employed by independent 
companies. As this is currently a role which involves only limited use of technology, 
the upskilling of these staff in the appropriate techniques and procedures to, for 
instance, effectively and ethically handle patient data will also require a considerable 
programme of training the workforce. The conceptual implications of these systemic 
barriers will be discussed following the second case featured in this chapter.    
 
Tampere: Smart City  
Finland has for the past three decades had a very strong innovation-focused economic 
development policy (Schienstock, 2004). The main expression of this at the sub-
national level has been the Centre of Expertise (OSKE) programme, which ran across 
three phases from 1994 to 2013. Tampere, as the largest city in Finland outside the 
Helsinki metropolitan area, was centrally involved in this programme from the start. 
Following a cluster-based logic, the OSKE programme encouraged participating 
localities to specialise in certain sectors or technologies. For Tampere, this entailed a 
sustained prioritisation of areas related to information and communication 
technologies (ICT), as well as mechanical engineering and automation, health 
technologies, and digital media. Reflecting national policy (see Ali-Yrkkö and 
Hermans, 2004), the ICT theme was to a large degree founded on the role of Nokia 
Corporation, which has one of its main research and development centres in Tampere, 
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as an anchor firm. While this strategy was clearly beneficial for a period, Nokia’s recent 
dramatic loss of global market share in its core mobile phone business has exposed 
the flaws of overdependence on this single actor. The Nokia Research Centre in 
Tampere has remained open (unlike branches in other Finnish localities), but following 
2011 has decreased significantly in size. This structural development in the economy 
contributed to an evolution of innovation policy thinking in the region, which has moved 
from the focus on sectoral and technological specialisation of the OSKE programme 
towards support of innovation platforms or ecosystems that can support cross-cutting 
development opportunities. Elements of this new ‘platform’ thinking were reflected at 
a national level in the Innovative Cities (INKA) programme, which began operating in 
2014 as a replacement for the OSKE programme. As the name suggests, the move to 
the INKA programme involved a scaling back to focus on the largest cities in Finland 
outside of the core Helsinki region. It was organised around: “Demand-driven, solution-
centred and multisectoral themes that combine several competence areas [which] 
were selected for the programme from among proposals submitted by the urban 
regions”4. Policymakers from Tampere were influential in shaping this approach, and 
it became the only city to be the lead participant for two themes identified through a 
local consultation process: smart cities and renewing industry.  
 
These INKA programme themes also became the basis for the priority fields in the 
region’s smart specialisation strategy (embedded in a broader 2014 Regional 
                                                          
4 See website of the Finnish Ministry of Employment and the Economy 
(https://www.tem.fi/en/innovations/strategic_centres_and_clusters/innovative_cities_program
me_(inka)). Accessed 15th February 2016.  
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Strategy)5. The organisation responsible for this strategy (as part of the local 
implementation of EU Structural Fund programmes) is the Regional Council, a 
statutory joint municipal authority covering the 22 municipalities in the Tampere region 
(Pirkanmaa). For the INKA programme, however, the main responsibility has been 
given directly to the largest single municipality, the City of Tampere (that alone 
accounts for almost half the population of the wider region). The programme itself has 
been managed through the economic development agency (TREDEA) for the City of 
Tampere and seven surrounding municipalities that together form a core city-region 
within Pirkanmaa.  
 
In practice the Regional Council and City of Tampere are closely connected through 
functional links and inter-personal networks, but this shift in governance is significant 
for the smart city theme that is the focus here. The role of the City of Tampere as the 
most important actor in articulating a vision for this theme in the region is reflected in 
the emphasis being as much on how innovation in this domain can help improve the 
delivery of public services for local citizens as it has been on how it can create new 
market opportunities for companies. Three smart city sub-themes have been adopted 
- intelligent traffic systems, resource-efficient city, and smart buildings and spaces - 
that aim to link new technological capabilities to urban development functions that are 
the responsibility of local government in Finland. Central to the smart city strategy in 
Tampere, therefore, is the mobilisation of the considerable resources that the urban 
municipalities have to support innovation in these areas; for instance through use of 
                                                          
5 As well as smart city and renewing industry, another priority area in the region included in 
the RIS3 is the emerging scientific field of regenerative medicine. For an account of the 
development of area in Tampere see Sotarauta and Mustikkamäki (2015). 
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public procurement (existing examples include initiatives in commissioning new 
electric buses and street lighting) and making municipal data openly available to 
companies and other actors such as university researchers or student teams6. The 
City plans to run demonstrator pilots in real-life environments, which will function as 
platforms to trial new forms of public service delivery as well as for companies to test 
new applications. Notably this approach is being deployed in a declining suburb with 
high levels of social exclusion in the city (Tesoma) with the aim of encouraging 
residents to actively participate in its regeneration.  
 
Shortly after the completion of our research in Tampere, and following a general 
election in Finland, a new government programme was announced that included a 
substantial reduction in the budget of the national technology and innovation funding 
agency Tekes. One consequence of this was that the INKA programme will be 
discontinued in 2016, and not as planned run until 2020. This removes a potential 
income stream for smart city related activities in Tampere, but does not necessarily 
mean that these activities will not proceed. While the INKA programme has been 
important in Tampere in terms of the renewal of innovation priorities and related 
institutions (for instance feeding into the smart specialisation strategy), it still required 
that projects it supported would be match funded from local sources. It seems likely, 
therefore, that the City of Tampere will still be able to take forward its smart city 
                                                          
6 The development of this municipality-led smart city approach has overlapped, and been 
informed, by a slightly earlier (starting in 2010) City of Tampere programme (Eco2 - Eco-
efficient Tampere 2020) to promote more sustainable energy use across its different urban 
planning and service functions, particularly relating to the building environment (construction) 
and transport. 
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strategy through the abovementioned mobilisation of its own resources in this 
direction. The City was also already drawing on other projects as tools to help 
implement this strategy and will continue to do so in the future. Most notably is an 
ongoing national programme (the Six City Strategy – Open and Smart Services) 
involving the six largest municipalities in Finland, which meets the current requirement 
for a proportion of EDRF funding to be used on sustainable urban development. This 
programme, which was in many ways synergistic with the planned INKA smart city 
activities, has three priority axes: open innovation platforms, open data and interfaces, 
and open (citizen) participation. 
 
While the development of smart city as an innovation priority in Tampere has been 
driven particularly from within local government, other institutional actors in the region 
have the potential to play an important role. This includes the two universities in the 
city - the University of Tampere (UTA) and Tampere University of Technology (TUT) 
– that have been central to the innovation-focused economy that has emerged since 
the decline of the region’s traditional manufacturing industries (Kostiainen and 
Sotarauta, 2003). The research strengths of TUT in particular, which has an inherent 
connection with industry from its profile in applied engineering and computing fields, 
are closely aligned with development priorities in the region. In the private sector, the 
receding importance of Nokia to the local economy has freed up resources, especially 
human capital, to be deployed in other enterprises. A government supported national 
scheme (Nokia Bridge) starting in 2011 helped former Nokia employees to form new 
technology start-ups utilising their considerable experience. The innovation platform 
programmes operated in Tampere by the New Factory organisation (including the 
Demola programme discussed below) also have a common concern with helping to 
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foster a more entrepreneurial culture amongst students, recent graduates, and 
experienced workers. By creating opportunities for new applications of the ICT 
capabilities in the region, the smart city domain can be seen as one possible route for 
the economy to branch into a new but related path7. The smart city sub-theme that is 
currently the leading candidate to emerge as a new industrial path in the region is that 
which relates to intelligent transport systems (ITS). This is in part due to the existence 
of a number of companies already active in this sector. A formal network vehicle, ITS 
Factory, has been formed to help engender collaborative projects involving these 
companies, local higher education/research institutions, and in some cases also the 
City of Tampere. Both universities have strengths in transport related research, but 
the UTA has been particularly active in this ITS Factory through a team led by a former 
Nokia expert in mobile ecosystem creation.    
 
The Regional Council and City of Tampere have also sought to develop this smart 
(and sustainable) city theme by making it a focus of a nascent cross-border 
partnership with the Swedish region of Scania (and its two university cities of Malmo 
and Lund), which aims to capitalise on potentially complementary strategic interests 
and institutional structures between these two Nordic localities (also see Trippl et al., 
2015). It is hoped that this partnership will grow into a sustained collaborative 
relationship involving multiple institutional actors from both regions, but in its initial 
                                                          
7 The related nature of the region’s ICT capabilities to smart city applications are, for instance, 
reflected in one of the two Competence Clusters that Tampere was coordinating city for in the 
third iteration of the OSKE programme (2007-2013) being Ubiquitous Computing, which was 
concerned with the implications of these technologies being embedded in evermore 
distributed environments. 
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form it has been taken forward by the respective Regional Councils under their mutual 
membership of the EU Vanguard Initiative for New Growth through Smart 
Specialisation. Another important mechanism at this early stage has been the Demola 
network, which supports multidisciplinary student teams from different higher 
education institutions to work together on small innovation projects around a case or 
problem provided by a third-party private or public sector organisation. Demola began 
operating in Tampere (in 2008) instigated by individuals from Nokia and the Hermia 
technology park as a way of encouraging more open innovation processes within the 
region, and its success helped to stimulate the abovementioned adoption of the 
platform approach in policy. Subsequently Demola (as a separate organisation 
attached to New Factory) has started operating through affiliates in around eight other 
locations throughout Europe including Scania (South Sweden), and part of its value 
for Tampere is now seen to be its use as a tool for building stronger international 
connections with other regions. This existing link with Scania, therefore, was utilised 
in 2014 through the running of a Smart City Accelerator across the two regions, which 
involved numerous Demola projects working with local city municipalities and 
companies relating to the priority themes of smart mobility, citizen participation, and 
smart city ecosystem (focusing on open data). Hence, this joint platform has proved 
to be an effective vehicle for generating activity in this smart and sustainable city area, 
and even if none of the ideas or solutions presented by the student teams is 
implemented in a real world environment, it has still given the partner organisations a 
valuable opportunity to explore where future collaboration could take place in, for 
instance, areas like public procurement or use of traffic data.      
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As with the Northern Ireland case described above, however, there are still institutional 
barriers to the formation of a fully functioning innovation system relating to this domain 
in Tampere. The most immediate of these, given its role in mobilising this smart city 
agenda, is the challenge of embedding appropriate practices (e.g. smart procurement) 
throughout the City of Tampere organisation that is oriented to core service delivery 
rather than innovation. Interviewees acknowledged that currently there is strong vision 
from a small number of people in leadership roles within this and related agencies 
(e.g. TREDEA), but it is acknowledged that the goal of encouraging the majority of its 
employees, habituated to more traditional ways of providing municipal services, to 
adjust to this vision will require a process of gradual institutional change. Similarly, 
while there is a high-level commitment to using smart city related initiatives to engage 
citizens more directly as participants in innovation processes, this is still seen as a 
novel approach that needs to overcome the tendency for many residents to think of 
themselves as just passive recipients of public services. In relation to the economic 
development, the further growth of an area like smart traffic into a significant industry 
for Tampere is contingent on the ability of local companies to scale-up their products 
or services so they can be exported to other markets with different urban infrastructure 
systems. This, interviewees foresaw, will require these companies to work with the 
larger multinational companies who are likely to emerge as global leaders in fields like 
electric cars over the next decade (echoing the earlier process through which the 
telecommunications industry underwent internationalisation).   
 
Conclusion 
By outlining the development of specific innovation domains that have become 
strategic priorities in the two regions, the case studies above illustrate the reciprocal 
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relationship between smart specialisation and local institutional, governance and 
economic contexts. In both instances the basis for these domains are inherited 
research and technological capabilities in the region that relate to strengths built up 
over time in research organisations and firms (e.g. health technologies in Northern 
Ireland’s universities, the Nokia-anchored ICT cluster in Tampere). The identification 
of these domains as opportunities for path development or branching by policymakers 
in the region also occurred through governance mechanisms – Matrix in Northern 
Ireland and the INKA programme consultation in Tampere - that already existed 
separately to the European Commission’s requirement to produce a smart 
specialisation strategy. At the same time the case studies have shown that the 
signalling of these domains as priorities has facilitated the further development of new 
or modified institutional relationships within the regions as part of a co-evolutionary 
dynamic. In Northern Ireland this has mainly taken the form of government 
departments and agencies (relating to both health and the economy) being prompted 
into investing in new vehicles such as CHIC, the Northern Ireland Connected Health 
Ecosystem, and Centre for Stratified Medicine. In Tampere it has taken the form of 
local actors, principally the City of Tampere municipality but also universities, firms 
and innovation intermediaries (e.g. Demola), mobilising their assets around the 
implementation of smart city applications in the region.        
 
In the theoretical framework being explored here, these new institutional arrangements 
mainly represent a strengthening of connections between organisational actors in the 
triple helix (government, industry, universities). As discussed earlier, the existence of 
an innovation system should not be assumed from the presence of these actors in a 
regional innovation ecology alone, but from the selective formation of systematic 
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connections between them around specific problems (Metcalfe et al., 2012). If the 
institutional developments noted above indicate that this formation of innovation 
systems around the strategic domains focused on has been proceeding within the two 
regions, the case studies equally highlight institutional barriers to this process 
occurring more fully, and in doing so help demonstrate the value of a system failure 
perspective to understanding smart specialisation dynamics (see Vallance, 2016). The 
main barriers identified in both regions include those that relate to the economic 
challenges of successfully leveraging the local knowledge domains into commercial 
enterprises with global market potential, but also to the organisational and cultural 
challenges of adapting to working with new technologies in the public sector (see 
Hughes et al., 2011).   
 
Together the case studies also support the argument that the emerging innovation 
systems have yet to take the form of a quadruple (rather than triple) helix arrangement 
in which societal users are centrally integrated. This is despite both regions exhibiting 
aspirations to move in this direction. In Tampere especially, there is a strong 
commitment to engage local citizens and use urban areas as ‘living laboratories’ as 
part of the municipality-led smart city agenda. In Northern Ireland there is also a 
growing recognition of the potential of broader forms of social innovation that 
encompass developments in areas such as connected health (Warnock, 2014). Actors 
in the domains covered in both regions also rely on the use of data generated by, for 
instance, public transport passengers or recipients of healthcare treatments. 
Currently, however, these non-professional users themselves seem to have a 
relatively limited role in actually shaping innovations in the two cases, and their access 
to be able to do this is mediated by public sector organisations (e.g. local authorities 
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or the health service). This may, therefore, approximate the version of the quadruple 
helix that Arnkil et al. (2010) call the “public-sector-centred living lab model”, but this 
does not necessarily equate to a system in which users or citizens are actively involved 
in co-development processes. It also means the system will be especially susceptible 
to the challenges of public sector innovation mentioned above. These issues, 
therefore, need to be taken into account when deciding on the appropriateness of the 
quadruple helix as a framework for analysing smart specialisation processes.  
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